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Abstract-Empirical studies of supplier-induced emand in health care have mostly concentrated on the 
analysis of physician behaviour. In this article, the focus is on the economic determinants of phys- 
iotherapist behaviour in The Netherlands. It is shown that relative prices work as strong incentives to alter 
the mix of services upplied, conform to the model of revenue maximization under a production constraint. 
However, the time-series analysis also gives ome indication that this ability to influence the demand for 
their services to increase hourly income is not fully exploited. The latter finding is inconsistent with pure 
income maximization but rather points to a trade-off between loss of revenue and demand manipulation. 
The fact that the choice of therapy varies with the pressure on provider incomes does cast some doubt 
on the appropriateness of the chosen patterns of treatment in terms of effectiveness. 
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1. INTRODUCnON 
Health economists tudying provider behaviour have 
generally been concerned with the behaviour of phys- 
icians as the most important decision makers in 
health care. A large number of behavioural models 
have been developed to explain such peculiar charac- 
teristics as supplier-induced emand (for reviews, see 
e.g. [l, 21). Less effort has been made to model the 
economic behaviour of paramedical personnel. This 
may partly be due to the fact that they, very often, 
are not responsible for important resource allocation 
decisions. This article illustrates that this neglect is 
not always justified. 
We have studied the behaviour of self-employed 
physiotherapists in The Netherlands. A model of 
rational revenue-maximizing behaviour is developed 
which takes into account the peculiarities of this 
market. We also propose an empirical test of 
supplier-induced emand which does not look at the 
volume but rather at the mix of services provided by 
physiotherapists. The predictions are tested by means 
of a time series analysis of physiotherapy utilization 
rates. In the period considered, new government 
regulatory measures were introduced with regard to 
both the volume and prices of physiotherapeutic care 
delivered to publicly insured patients. The variation 
caused by these interventions enabled us to test for a 
response in provider behaviour. The major question 
we seek to answer is whether, how and to what extent 
the choice of therapy is determined by economic 
variables such as prices and incomes. The results are 
discussed in view of the agency role of the physio- 
therapist for patient and society. 
2. DEMAND FOR AVD SUPPLY OF PHYSlOTHERiPY 
IN THE NETHERLANDS 
In The Netherlands physiotherapeutic care is com- 
pletely covered under public health insurance and 
subject to a number of regulations [3]. Publicly 
insured patients (70% of the Dutch population) 
cannot consult a physiotherapist on their own ini- 
tiative but have to be referred by their GP or 
specialist. Patients only express an undifferentiated 
demand for care by consulting a physician. The 
referring physician prescribes the number of physio- 
therapeutic treatments (visits) to be given but in 
general eaves the decision about the composition of 
the treatment o the physiotherapist. A typical ‘com- 
bined treatment’ consists of massage/exercise therapy 
possibly in combination with one or more so-called 
‘applications’ which are forms of therapy that make 
use of electricity, heat or ultrasound. Treatment is 
completely free of charge to the public patient. The 
physiotherapist working in private practice is remu- 
nerated on the basis of a fee per item of service. 
Because the fees differ according to the type of 
therapy, it is clear that this situation creates incen- 
tives for the providers to manipulate the demand for 
their services. A considerable amount of uncertainty 
about the effectiveness of most forms of therapy, and 
therefore the lack of firm indications as to which 
therapy is appropriate for which diagnosis, increases 
the freedom of choice of therapy for the physio- 
therapist. It is not surprising then to find that a large 
variation in treatment patterns across practices re- 
mains even after correction for diagnosis. Whether 
this variation is merely random and thus a con- 
sequence of professional uncertainty [4] or has also 
got something to do with rational economic behav- 
iour is a question in which we are interested here. 
Complete coverage of expenditures for publicly 
insured patients on the demand side, and an un- 
restricted rapid growth of the number of physio- 
therapists remunerated fee-for-service on the supply 
side, have caused an increase of physiotherapeutic 
expenditures in The Netherlands, which is much 
higher than the general increase in health care ex- 
penditures. While undeflated total health care costs 
have tripled between 1972 and 1982, the costs for 
physiotherapeutic care were in 1982 five-fold the level 
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of 1972. Troubled by this rapid growth. the govem- 
ment introduced some new regulation concerning 
tariffs and volume of physiotherapeutic care provided 
to publicly insured patients. 
The fee measure was introduced 1 October, 1979. 
Before that time, there were only two fees: one for 
massage/exercise therapy and one for the technical 
applications. However, because the average duration 
of each application is different, the marginal revenue 
for the physiotherapist per unit of time spent using an 
application differed also. To the degree that substi- 
tution is possible and the physiotherapist’s time input 
scarce, applications with a shorter average duration 
were clearly more attractive. Substitution was, how- 
ever, not strictly necessary since it was also allowed 
to perform more than one application per treatment. 
With the introduction of the fee measure ‘standard 
durations in minutes’ were attached to all forms of 
therapy but the fee per minute was the same for every 
activity. Of course, this implied some drastic changes 
in the fees per type of therapy. As can be seen 
from Table 1, all fees were lowered except for 
massage/exercise and low-frequency electrotherapy. 
The second measure, here after called volume 
measure, was implemented on 1 April, 1980 and was 
aimed at limiting the use of technical applications 
because of their doubtful effectiveness. Series of more 
than 12 combined treatments (massage plus appli- 
cation) were no longer allowed, nor was the use of 
more than one application per treatment. 
3. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF PHYSIOTHERAPIST 
BEHAVlOtiR 
In this section we will illustrate the behaviour of 
Dutch physiotherapists by means of the optimization 
problem faced by a firm which is jointly producing 
multiple outputs. The model could, however, be 
applied to any health care provider, who can choose 
between different compositions of treatment mix 
under certain constraints [5]. 
Consider a physiotherapist who has to produce a 
given number of visits V”, which is the input that is 
exogenously determined by the referring physicians. 
Given his initial endownments of labour and capital 
(which are assumed to be fixed in the short run) a 
production possibility frontier exists which represents 
all combinations of two applications A, and Al that 
can be produced in V” visits. Such a transformation 
curve, which is concave to the origin, is represented 
in Fig. 1. 
Fig. 1. Production constrained revenue maximization. 
This particular shape of the transformation curve 
is obtained because the production technology ex- 
hibits a trade-off: it is impossible to combine both 
applications in every visit and the use of each of them 
is limited by the number of visits V”. Given this 
product transformation constraint, the supplier can 
try to reach the maximal revenue by choosing the 
combination of A, and AZ indicated by the tangency 
locus of the revenue line and the production frontier. 
In Fig. 1 this is point A, where the relative output 
price ratio (P1/P2) equals the marginal rate of trans- 
formation between A, and A?. It is clear that a change 
in the relative price ratio from Pi/P2 to Pi/Pi would 
induce a shift from point A to B: more A, and less 
A, will be supplied as a consequence of the fact that 
A2 has become more attractive to the supplier in 
terms of marginal revenue. From the first order 
conditions of this maximization problem conditional 
supply functions in terms of relative prices and input 
can be derived [6]. 
Theoretically, it is also possible to define health 
isoquants in this context: these are curves which 
represent all combinations of A, and A, with which 
the same health outcome for the patients can be 
obtained. In Fig. 1 two such health isoquants are 
drawn convex to the origin, reflecting the assumption 
of imperfect substitutability between applications [7& 
If the physiotherapist acted as a perfect agent for his 
patients, he would choose that combination of appli- 
cations on the production possibility frontier which is 
tangent to the highest attainable health isoquant. 
Point C in Fig. 1 represents this sort of welfare 
TberaDv’ 
Table I. Fee changes per type of therapy 
Fee (in Dfl.) 
Standard 
duration Before After 




Ultrasound application (ULTRA) 
High-frequency electro 
Aoulication (HFEL) 
Tlkmo application (THERMO) 
20 13,47 17.56 
15 Ii,78 13.17 
IO Il.78 8.78 
6 11,78 5,72 
IO 11.78 8.78 
*Some minor therapies which are used infrequently and the tariffs for delivering care at the 
home of the patient are not reponed here. 
Source: Curfs [I 7, p. 84. 
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optimum as the tangency locus between the trans- 
formation curve Vo and the health isoquant HH. 
Such behaviour would be characterized by the ab- 
sence of any output price sensitivity on the part of 
suppliers: the choice of therapy rmx would not be 
influenced by relative prices. 
Much of the health care supply literature of the last 
decade has concentrated on the question of whether 
providers (mostly physicians) can and do influence 
the demand for their services. Evans [8] has pointed 
out that the crucial empirical issue is not whether 
providers manipulate their patient’s demand to in- 
crease their own income, but whether they fully 
exploit this ability to do so. Clearly, if they do then, 
at the optimum, demand becomes again exogenous 
and the income-maximizing case cannot be dis- 
tinguished from the supplier-inducement case. The 
critical empirical test therefore, becomes the 
identification of unexploited potential to influence 
demand which varies with the extent of economic 
pressure on the provider (21. 
Traditionally, the frequently observed positive 
correlation-both cross-sectionally and over time- 
between the number of providers per capita and both 
price and quantity traded in equilibrium, was quoted 
as evidence of supplier-induced demand. Several 
authors [l, 91 have argued that such findings might 
also be consistent with the standard neo-classical 
model of income maximization when factors such as 
quality of care, time prices or the existence of excess 
demand are taken into consideration. In a similar 
way, the rapid growth in the recent past of physio- 
therapeutic are utilization parallel with the growth 
in provider density in The Netherlands is sometimes 
quoted as evidence of supplier-induced creation of 
demand [lo]. But this phenomenon can also be 
explained as an effect of catching up with excess 
demand at the prevailing zero user prices in the public 
sector. 
Instead of looking at the total quantity of demand, 
we propose a test of supplier-induced transformation 
of demand (111. The revenue-maximization model 
predicts that the composition of utilization will 
depend on the relative prices of the treatment com- 
ponents. An exogenous hift in the incomes, such as 
the one induced by the restrictive volume measure, 
should not affect this composition when the ability to 
manipulate demand was already fully exploited be- 
fore the change [ 121. If substitution towards a higher 
marginal revenue per unit of time is observed after 
the exogenous shift in income, this implies that 
income was not ma.ximized before and therefore that 
the discretionary power to influence demand was not 
fully realized. Such an observation can only be 
explained by a model which assumes that providers 
do not only derive utility from real income but also 
from some sort of ‘ethical behaviour’. Both objectives 
are traded-off against each other and it is only when 
income is reduced exogenously, and therefore the 
marginal utility of income is raised, that providers are 
willing to suffer the marginal disutility of demand 
manipulation [l]. In the empirical analysis, we will 
attempt to test for such behaviour by investigating 
whether the mix of services provided is affected by the 
exogenously induced income reduction through the 
government limitation on the applications per visit 
ratio. 
4. DATA DESCRIF’TION 
In order to test the behavioural hypotheses, quar- 
terly data were gathered on physiotherapeutic are 
utilization in the 36 practices of the sickness fund 
region of North Limburg from 1978 to 1981. This 
sample cannot be said to be representative of the 
whole country but it is the only sickness fund with 
these data available over the considered period and 
there is no reason to expect physiotherapist behav- 
iour in this region to be different from the rest of the 
country. 
Figure 2 shows the aggregated quarterly data for 
the number of visits (VIS), exercise/massage therapy 
(M/E) and applications (APPL) over the four year 
period. At least three observations can be made from 
this graph. First, there is a consistent seasonal vari- 
ation in utilization with substantial reductions in the 
summer quarter (July-August-September). Secondly, 
gradually the number of massage therapies has ap- 
I,,,,,,,,,,,,,, ] I 1 
2% 2 3 4 12 3 4 12 3 41 2 3 4 
1978 1979 1980 1981 
Fig. 2. Physiotherapy utilization rates (quarterly data 1978-1981). (0) Visits; (+) M/E therapy; 
(A) applications. 
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proached the number of visits so that by the end of 
1981 almost all consultations include massage ther- 
apy. This is not at all surprising since we know that 
this type of therapy was remunerated higher after the 
first measure and the volume of other therapies 
restricted after the second measure. And thirdly, we 
see a sharp decline in the total number of applications 
after the implementation of the volume-restricting 
measure in the second quarter of 1980. The quantity 
of applications stabilizes after a few quarters at a level 
which is about half the level before the intervention. 
More interesting than what happened to the total 
number of applications is the evolution of the relative 
shares of the specific types of applications within this 
total. These are depicted in Fig. 3 for the four main 
categories of applications which together account for 
about 97% of the total. The relatively stable pattern 
of the distribution between the four types of therapy 
before the interventions has changed drastically at 
the end of 1979. The share of high-frequency electro- 
therapy (HFEL) dropped sharply from 45% to about 
30% whereas the shares of both low-frequency elec- 
trotherapy (LFEL) and thermal therapy (THERMO) 
went up almost simultaneously. Only the share of 
ultrasound (ULTRA) remained fairly stable and vir- 
tually unaffected by the price and volume regulation. 
This means, of course, that in absolute quantity terms 
ultrasound therapy fell at the general rate of decrease 
in the number of physiotechnic applications. This 
conforms to the fact that ultrasound is used only for 
some rather well-determined indications and cannot 
easily substitute other applications or be substituted 
for by others. 
5. SPECIFICATION AND JSl-IMATION OF 
STRUCI-LXAL EQUATIOY MODEL 
In order to quantify some of the above mentioned 
effects and to test for their statistical significance, we 
specified the following structural equation model: 
Equation 1: 
In M/E = z,, + fi,, In VIS 
+ y,, DPRICE + b, In APPL + co 
035 
Q25 
Equations 2 to 5: 
In; = Y, + 8, In VIS i 7, DPRICE 
+ 6, In APPL + E, (i = 1, 2,3,4). 
Equation 1 explains the (logarithm of the) number of 
massage/exercise (M/E) therapies by the number of 
visits, the dummy variable DPRICE indicating the 
shift in prices and the total number of applications 
(APPL). The latter variable should capture the effect 
of the volume measure. Because of the loglinear 
specification, the parameters ,!I,, and 6, can be inter- 
preted as elasticities and y0 as the percentage rate of 
change in M/E due to the price change. Because all 
prices changed simultaneously, it is statistically im- 
possible to estimate own and cross price elasticities 
separately. 
The only difference between equation 1 and equa- 
tions 2-5 is that not absolute quantities but relative 
shares of applications are the dependent variables. 
Consequently, the j,‘s and the 6,‘s represent share 
elasticities and the yis rates of change in relative 
shares. The system of equations has to be estimated 
simultaneously because of the dependency between 
the disturbance terms which is introduced by the sum 
constraint [ 131 
In that case the contemporaneous correlation be- 
tween the 6,‘s cannot be assumed to be zero. The 
covariances between the disturbance terms can be 
estimated either by a generalized least squares (e.g. 
Zellner’s seemingly unrelated regressions estimator) 
or by a maximum likelihood method. Both esti- 
mation procedures have identical asymptotic proper- 
ties [14]. We have estimated the system by the 
full information maximum likelihood method of the 
LISREL V program [ 151. The results are presented in 
Table 2. 
In general, the model fits the data reasonably well: 
except for the ultrasound equation, the explanatory 
power indicated by the RZ is fairly high and the 
0.1 5 
0.1 0 
+-+-+_+, +-+-+-:--*\ ,+-+ I+ *--C-i-+ 
o.osL ’ 1 ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ ’ 1 
1234123412341234 
1979 1979 1980 1981 
Fig. 3. Application shares (quarterly data 1978-1981). (A) THERMO; (a) LFEL; (A) HFEL; 
(+) ULTRA. 
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Table 2. Full informatIon ma.ximum likelihood reeression results 
CONST VIS APPL DPRICE I?’ D.W. 
M:E - 1.261 1.168 -0.067 0.025 0.805 2.08 
(0.68, (6.35) (2.17) (1.25) 
LFEL 6.677 -0.61 I -0.097 0.107 0.790 I .65 
(1.74) (1.61) (1.53) (2.56) 
HFEL 0.337 -0.334 0.3 18 -0.175 0.951 2.05 
(-10) (l.@v (5.92) (1.97) 
ULTRA - 17.021 I.394 -0.097 -0.025 0.260 I .47 
(2.27) (1.88) (0.78) (0.3 I) 
THERM0 -7.300 0.759 -0.250 0.182 0.963 1.60 
(2.66) (2.78) (5.50) (6. IO) 
R* is the coefficient of determination. adjusted for degrees of freedom. D.W. is the 
Durbin-Watson test statistic for first order serial correlation. Absolute t-values in 
parentheses. Only the covariance of the disturbance terms of the LFEL- and HFEL- 
quations was significant: COV (c,, 6:) = -0.001 (f-value = 2.15). 
Durbin-Watson statistic rejects the test for first-order 
serial correlation. The interpretation of the first equa- 
tion is different from the other four equations. The 
parameter PO, the visits elasticity, is close to 1 and 
highly significant, which means that M/E therapy 
follows the general seasonal and trend variation 
expressed by the number of visits. The applications 
elasticity 6, equals -0.06 and is also statistically 
significant. This indicates that, as a reaction to the 
governmental restriction of applications by about 
50%, physiotherapists have increased the number of 
M/E therapies by about 3%. 
Finally, as a result of the price shift, M/E therapy 
has increased only by about 2% and this effect is not 
statistically significant at conventional confidence 
levels. The finding that both the volume and the price 
effect on M/E therapy are so small is not surprising 
because M/E was already applied during more than 
90% of the visits before the changes occurred so that, 
holding visits constant, this percentage could only 
slightly be raised. 
The coefficients in the application share equations 
need to be interpreted with caution. If some estimates 
do not differ significantly from zero this does not 
mean that these variables do not affect the total 
supply of this service but simply that the effect does 
not differ from that on the total amount of appli- 
cations delivered. Consequently, the relative share 
remains unaltered. For instance, we notice that the 
seasonal and trend variation captured by VIS only 
has a significant positive effect on the share of 
THERMO. 
The question we are mainly interested in is how the 
mix of application services has changed after the 
introduction of the government measures. It can be 
seen from the coefficients of DPRICE that LFEL has 
gone up by 10.7%, HFEL has decreased by 17.5%, 
ULTRA was unaffected and THERM0 went up by 
18.2% after 1 October, 1979. This implies positive 
price elasticities for LFEL and HFEL, a zero price 
elasticity for ULTRA and a negative price elasticity 
for THERIMO [16]. However, this interpretation 
overlooks some prior information on product trans- 
formation possibilities in physiotherapy. Both LFEL 
and THERM0 can in some cases be substituted for 
HFEL but are rather poor substitutes for each other 
[17]. This means that we have to look at the relarice 
price changes of these types of therapy compared to 
HFEL. If we take this into account all price effects 
are positive, even for THERM0 because, relative to 
HFEL, its price has also risen. 
This shift of the treatment mix towards the higher 
revenue application was compounded by the second 
measure which restricted the number of applications 
that could be done during one visit. This can be seen 
from the coefficients for APPL which measure the 
share elasticities with respect o the total number of 
applications: positive (0.32) for HFEL, negative for 
THERM0 (-0.25) and LFEL (-0.10) and non- 
significant for ULTRA. This implies that, ceteris 
paribus, the decrease in applications by approx. 50% 
has resulted in a 16% (=0.32 x 50) drop of the 
HFEL share which was compensated by a rise in the 
shares of LFEL and THERM0 by respectively 5and 
12.5%. Or, once more, a shift towards the more 
attractive applications in terms of marginal revenue. 
The latter finding points to some degree of un- 
exploited ability to manipulate the mix of services 
before the volume-restricting measure was intro- 
duced. We cannot conclude anything about the 
appropriateness of the different application mixes 
because we could not measure any outcomes in terms 
of patient’s health status. However, the fact that no 
evidence was reported of effects on health outcomes 
does cast some doubt on the effectiveness of the 
100% higher rates of applications that were per- 
formed before the restrictive measure. In general, the 
multiple regression analysis confirms the picture 
which already emerged from Figs 1 and 2: both the 
price and volume measure have had a strong impact 
on the number of services delivered by physio- 
therapists. As a reaction to both interventions, 
physiotherapists altered the average mix of 
massage/exercise and application therapy towards a 
higher marginal revenue per unit of time. 
6. CONCLUSION .U%D POLICY MPLICATIOSS 
The analysis of physiotherapeutic utilization in 
sections 4 and 5 does lend a considerable amount of 
support to the hypothesis that changes in relative 
prices work as strong incentives for suppliers to alter 
the mix of services supplied. As a reaction to the 
restriction on the number of applications and to 
the relative price rise of exercise/massage therapy the 
utilization of this type of therapy has increased such 
that it is currently being performed in almost every 
visit. Secondly, all applications show a signiticant 
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positive own price elasticity except for ultrasound 
which did not show any price sensitivity. Thermal 
therapy was the only exception with a negative own 
price responsiveness but this was shown to be the 
result of not taking into account that the fee for 
thermal therapy had in fact been raised (instead of 
lowered) relative to high frequency electrotherapy, 
its closest substitute. The r&rice price elasticity 
was also positive for this type of physiotherapeutic 
application. 
It is therefore concluded that the perfect agency 
relationship hypothesis had to be rejected. Positive 
relative price elasticities are, however, still compatible 
with both the income-leisure maximization and 
supplier-inducement hypothesis. In order to discrim- 
inate between these two alternative explanations it 
was argued that evidence is needed on incomplete 
exploitation of the ability to induce demand. The test 
proposed in this paper is to see whether the therapy 
mix is altered towards a higher marginal revenue per 
unit of time if income is reduced exogenously. It turns 
out that indeed the shares of higher revenue appli- 
cations (low frequency electrotherapy and thermo- 
therapy) have risen considerably at the expense of the 
lower revenue substitute (high frequency electro- 
therapy) when the maximum allowable applications 
per visit ratio was halved by the public insurance 
agency. If pure income maximization were the driving 
force behind physiotherapist behaviour, why then 
was this different mix of applications not adopted 
before the restrictive volume measure? 
The final question which remains is whether 
supplier-induced transformation of demand is neces- 
sarily a bad thing. The fact that physiotherapists (or 
health care providers in general) are sensitive to 
financial incentives could also be used in a positive 
way by the regulators. If information were collected 
on the cost-effectiveness of different therapies this 
could be used as a basis for the determination of the 
iee schedule. Our analysis certainly predicts that 
when cost-effective therapies are rewarded more, they 
will be substituted for less cost-effective ones. If, on 
the other hand, such information is unlikely to 
become available in the near future due to the 
problems associated with the comparability of phys- 
iotherapy evaluation study results [18], a case- 
payment financing system is worth considering. 
When physiotherapists are paid a fixed amount of 
money per patient treated and preferably adjusted for 
diagnosis, then they can themselves decide on the mix 
of services to be provided for this amount [19]. Free 
choice for the patients to choose between providers 
(competing with quality, not with prices) should 
guarantee that quality is not lowered due to under- 
provision of services. The incentive for supplier- 
induced substitution of demand under such a closed- 
end financing system would then possibly take the 
form of choosing the cost-minimizing combination of 
therapies in order to maximize residual revenue. But 
such behaviour may be preferable to the current 
situation in the open-ended fee-for-service financing 
system. 
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